ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ ΚΑΙ ΑΠΟΨΕΙΣ

Abstract The Greek crisis should not be considered an unexpected phenomenon. On the contrary, it has been caused by, among other things, rushed political decisions, incomplete EU institutions of governance and hidden political and economic causes. We analyze the optimality and effectiveness of the European monetary framework on two different levels, first by applying the OCA criteria to the EMU. Second, by evaluating the main political and economic institutions and their vulnerabilities within the European level. We claim that many European countries, including Greece and other countries of Southern Europe remain unable to afford the vulnerable and one-sided, weak political and economic European monetary context. Additionally, we claim that unless deep governance structures emerge, a possible enlargement of the eurozone could create more costs than benefits for both the candidate members and the Eurozone itself. JEL Code: G01, F50 Key words: Political Economy, Optimal Cu

Abstract This paper will examine whether the euro could surpass the American’s greenback or it is likely to continue to exist as a subordinate currency. In order to do that we need to focus both on economics and politics as they directly or indirectly affect the role of the euro. In this article we will argue that even though the introduction of the euro in 1999 had considerable implications for the global financial, monetary, and economic system, the euro as a medium of exchange, as a store of value, and as a unit of account remains and it will continue to remain the second global reserve currency in the world. Moreover, it could be argued that not only the Eurozone the last ten years suffers from serious deficiencies that negatively affect the euro’s leading role as a global reserve currency but also the political and institutional conditions do not favor such evolution. Under these conditions it could be said that it is unlikely for the euro to overcome the pre-eminence of th